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Rereading Kant's Critique of Judgment: 
1790-1990 
Introduction 
Guenter Zoeller 
THE OCCASION for the symposium on Kant's Critique of Judgment held 
at The University of Iowa, April 1990, was the two-hundredth anniver 
sary of the publication of the third Critique, in 1790, with the Critique of 
Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason having been published in 
1781 and 1788, respectively. 
From May 1989 through April 1990 a group of Iowa faculty members 
from various disciplines met in a discussion group analyzing and critiquing 
the Critique of Judgment, starting with its first part, the "Critique of Aes 
thetic Judgment," and eventually turning to the second part, the "Cri 
tique of Teleological Judgment." Each of the original members of the dis 
cussion group then prepared a short, fifteen-minute essay for presentation 
at the symposium. The presenters approached Kant's text and its problems 
from their respective research interests and home disciplines. The point 
was to combine individual disciplinary work with its presentation and dis 
cussion in a multi-disciplinary setting. 
It could be argued that the symposium's broad perspective is a continua 
tion of the multiform reception that the third Critique has been accorded 
over the past two hundred years. The Critique of Judgment was received 
enthusiastically by Schiller and Goethe, the former taking it as the basis for 
his own aesthetic theorizing, the latter admiring in particular the novel 
treatment of the teleological consideration of nature. Kant's aesthetic 
theory, with its insistence on the disinterestedness of the aesthetic attitude 
and with its balanced consideration of aesthetic production in the theory 
of genius and aesthetic criticism in the analysis of the standard of taste, 
became the starting point for romantic and post-romantic artistic practice 
as well as for reflection on matters of art and beauty. Even the opposition 
to Kant's aesthetics in the works of Schelling and Hegel is a reaction to 
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Kant rather than an entirely autonomous intellectual development. More 
recently, much aesthetic debate has been conducted in thoroughly Kantian 
terms. This holds equally for Anglo-American analytic aesthetics with its 
neo-Kantian emphasis on the logic and grammar of aesthetic discourse and 
for Continental developments such as the revisionary work on Kant's 
theory of the sublime undertaken by Jacques Derrida and Fran?ois Lyo 
tard. 
It might be helpful to recapitulate the principal parts and doctrines of 
the third Critique, with an emphasis on those topics that are addressed in 
more detail in the symposium papers. The Critique of Judgment consists of 
two parts, the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" and the "Critique of 
Teleological Judgment," preceded by a substantial Introduction that pro 
vides the rationale for treating aesthetics and teleology in one single philo 
sophical treatise. The unity of the third Critique consists in its comprehen 
sive objective of determining the possibilities and limitations of a cognitive 
faculty left hitherto unexamined in Kant's critical oeuvre. The capacity in 
question is that of reflective judgment (reflektierende Urteilskraft), under 
stood, by Kant, as the mind's capacity to search for the rule covering a 
given particular case or a number of relevantly similar cases. Kant argues 
that our reflective judgment's search for empirical laws is guided by our 
presupposition of a thoroughly systematic constitution of nature, such 
that each empirical fact can, in principle, be integrated into a hierarchical 
structure of laws of nature. Kant's point is not that nature is systematic as 
a matter of fact. Rather, the systematic constitution of nature is an a priori 
presupposition on the side of the human intellect, reflecting our need to 
think of nature as, in principle, amenable to the requirements of human 
knowledge and its characteristic limitations. Any actual compliance of 
nature with the human conditions of knowing remains a contingent or acci 
dental matter. 
The system of nature thus conceived by reflective judgment has a purpo 
sive structure, exhibiting an order identical to that which it might have 
could it be known to be the result of an intelligent agent's production. 
There is no claim, though, on Kant's part, that the system of nature is 
actually a product of divine design. On the contrary, the purposiveness 
attributed to nature from the standpoint of reflective judgment is merely a 
subjectively informed way of reflecting upon nature guided by universal 
human cognitive interests. Kant specifically qualifies nature's purposive 
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ness by calling it subjective, that is dependent upon and limited to a certain 
anthropologically determined perspective. The claims that are advanced in 
the aesthetic and teleology parts of the Critique of Judgment are not knowl 
edge claims regarding nature's objective constitution. They are claims 
concerning the necessity of reflecting upon nature in certain ways ?claims 
originating in human needs and interests rather than in the way things are. 
The 
"Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" analyzes the purposiveness we 
find in nature with reference to the feeling of pleasure and displeasure. 
Kant holds that the discovery of instances of purposiveness between nature 
and human reason is the source of a pleasure that originates in the cogni 
tive faculty as such and that is not mediated by the faculty of desire. More 
over, Kant argues that the awareness of such pleasure-inducing purposive 
ness need not depend on instances of actual cognition, as in the case of 
knowing that this rose is red. There are instances, according to Kant, in 
which the mere reflection on the general suitability of objects to our 
human cognitive capabilities produces pleasure in the reflecting subject. In 
such cases the object of reflection is not considered regarding any specific 
purpose but merely regarding its generic simulation of actual purposive 
ness. The forms so considered are the spatio-temporal features of objects, 
and the objects, insofar as pleasure is taken in them, are termed "beautiful."' 
Kant's detailed analysis of the concept of the beautiful takes the form of 
an 
exposition of the principal logical features of judgments that predicate 
beauty, the so-called judgments of taste. Kant argues that judgments of 
taste are, first, singular in that they concern a particular object (this rose); 
second, that they are disinterested in that they disregard the matter of fac 
tual existence of the object in question (personal possession of this rose is 
not an issue); third, that they have as their ground the formal purposive 
ness of objects (the rose's peculiar spatial form); and, fourth, that their 
mode of validity is universal and yet in a decisive sense subjective (the 
rose's beauty is intimated to everyone else considering it). 
Much of the discussion in the remainder of the 
"Critique of Aesthetic 
Judgment" attempts to account for the paradoxical combination of subjec 
tivity and universality in judgments concerning the beautiful. Kant first 
invokes the cognitive constitution of our common human nature as the 
basis for the demanded agreement in matters of taste, postulating the 
operations of an aesthetically relevant "common sense." He then proceeds 
to draw on a decidedly metaphysical doctrine basing human beings, and 
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empirical reality in general, on an unknowable absolute reality, what Kant 
calls the 
"supersensible substratum." The speculative reference to the super 
sensible substratum of humanity is adduced in Kant's solution of the so 
called 
"antinomy of taste." The antinomy obtains between aesthetic 
empiricism (which maintains that there is no disputing in matters of taste) 
and aesthetic rationalism (which maintains that judgments of taste are 
based on rational standards warranting contention). Kant's solution con 
sists in conceding the unavailability of rational standards while defending 
the idea of an objective, though inaccessible ground functioning as the 
enabling condition for possible aesthetic agreement 
? thus interpreting the 
principal possibility of universal aesthetic agreement as an ideal norm for 
concrete aesthetic debate. By extension, then, the antinomy of taste 
becomes the everyday concern of museum and gallery directors, critics, 
and editors, as of this magazine. 
In addition to an exposition, deduction and dialectic concerning the 
beautiful, the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" also contains a novel 
treatment of the aesthetic category of the sublime. Kant analyzes the sub 
lime as a property not of the object giving rise to the experience in ques 
tion but as a feature of the aesthetically experiencing subject ?sublime is 
the human mind in its intellectual and moral superiority over an object 
that otherwise threatens the subject through sheer size (mathematically 
sublime) or physical force (dynamically sublime). 
While the primary concern of the "Critique of Aesthetic Judgment" is 
with the aesthetic status of objects of nature, there is also considerable 
attention devoted to applying the analyses of aesthetic judgments concern 
ing nature to products of human making (art), especially to the "fine arts." 
Kant considers art as striving for aesthetic conditions similar to those of 
nature, an assimilationist view of the relation between art and nature that 
finds its most elementary expression in the doctrine of genius as nature's 
way of giving rules to art. 
The second part of the Critique of Judgment, the "Critique of Teleologi 
cal Judgment," extends the reflection on the finality of nature to the phen 
omenon of organic life. In keeping with the limitations of reflective judg 
ment, Kant's theoretical biology and ensuing considerations on the moral 
vocation of human beings are not presented as dogmatic statements about 
the way things are but in the reflective mode of expressing human needs 
for cognitive as well as moral orientation. 
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The five essays that follow take up a number of central issues in the Cri 
tique of Judgment from perspectives originating in philosophy, philology 
and literary criticism. Richard Fumerton approaches Kant's aesthetics 
with the conceptual tools provided by Kant's Scottish contemporary, 
David Hume. David Stern sketches a pluralist alternative to Kant's own 
treatment of disagreements in matters of taste. Guenter Zoeller explores 
the structural parallelism between Kant's theory of aesthetic experience 
and Kant's theory of knowledge. Marlena Corcoran engages in an etymo 
logical and terminological study of key concepts employed by Kant. Don 
ald Marshall links Kant's theory of art to the contemplation of nature in 
English romanticism. Beyond their disciplinary differences, the essays 
show a common interest in the problematic status of aesthetic experience 
with its precarious balance of feeling and perceiving, of subjectivity and 
objectivity, of particular case and universal rule. 
Note on translation used: 
In the papers all references to the Critique of Judgment are to the translation 
by W. S. Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987). 
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